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Electoral Coalitions and Policy Reversals in Portugal and
Italy in the Aftermath of the Eurozone Crisis
Alexandre Afonso and Fabio Bulfone
ABSTRACT
This paper links patterns of deregulatory reforms and post-
crisis reversals in Italy and Portugal with the electoral con-
stituencies of political parties. Combining insights from the
social coalitions and electoral behaviour debates, we link
reform outcomes to the class set-up of the electorate in
the two countries by using the class schema developed by
Daniel Oesch. We find that governments in both countries
reversed austerity measures in order to protect core groups
of voters within their electorate in spite of wide ideological
differences between governing coalitions in the two coun-
tries. There is, however, some variation in the extent of the




social blocs; political parties;
Portugal; Italy
At the peak of the eurozone crisis, South European governments implemented
harsh and unpopular austerity measures, often under pressure from bond
markets, European institutions and international lenders (Afonso 2019). As
the level of this pressure declined from 2014 onwards, politicians competing
for office in the region repeatedly pledged to roll back these measures. The
Portuguese left-wing coalition in office since 2015 has partially delivered on its
promises, gaining praise for ‘turning the page on austerity’ and offering ‘a
powerful rebuke’ to the neoliberal orthodoxy (Jones 2017). Some commenta-
tors have gone as far as arguing that the European left ‘should use the
Portuguese experience as a model to reshape the European Union and bring
austerity across the eurozone to a halt’ (Jones 2017). In Italy, the coalition
between the radical right Lega (League) and the catch-all populist Movimento
Cinque Stelle (M5S – Five Star Movement) promised – and partially delivered
once in office – an overhaul of the reforms implemented by the previous
technocratic and centre-left governments. Interestingly, we can observe
a similar pattern of reversals despite the profound ideological differences
between the executives of the two countries.
How can we explain these similarities, and how do electoral incentives play
out in constraining government decisions? Drawing on Peter Mair’s (2013)
distinction between responsiveness and responsibility, this article focuses on
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how responsive governments have been to the electorate in the context of the
crisis and its aftermath in Portugal and Italy. To do so, we compare reforms and
reversals affecting two electorally salient policy areas: pensions and employ-
ment protection legislation (EPL).
Building on work analysing the sociological base of politics, we focus less on
responsiveness towards public opinion or measured voter preferences (which
tend to be fairly volatile and shaped by single policies) and more on respon-
siveness vis-à-vis the perceived material interests of different social groups,
such as production workers, managers or small business owners. For instance,
we argue that in countries where constituencies with interests harmed by
liberalisation are large, politicians will have strong incentives to roll over
austerity measures. The social setup of parties will also shape the nature of
policies implemented. In other words, we look at how the social composition
of party electorates constrains and shapes government policies. Our main
contribution is to use a granular socio-economic analysis of party electorates
to understand the incentives for parties to engage in policy reversals. In doing
so, we draw on two bodies of literature. The first is grounded in political
economy and assumes that public policies can be explained by the nature of
coalitions between different social groups in society (see for example Iversen &
Soskice 2006; Amable & Palombarini 2009; Baccaro & Pontusson 2018).
The second body of literature examines the changing nature of class and
how it shapes electoral behaviour (Oesch & Rennwald 2018). We combine
these two strands to connect policy developments in the aftermath of the
crisis in Portugal and Italy with the social setup of party electorates.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In section two, we outline the
theoretical framework of our analysis illustrating the link between the class
composition of the electorate and policy-makers’ reform strategies. In section
three, we explain the rationale for the selection of our countries and policy
areas of interest and illustrate our empirical approach combining European
Social Survey (ESS) data with the Oesch class categories. Section four provides
some background information on the pre-crisis and post-crisis political context
in Italy and Portugal. This is followed by an analysis of the social composition
of the electorate in Italy and Portugal, and two empirical sections accounting
for the pattern of reforms and reversals in our policy areas of interest.
Electoral class coalitions and policy reversals
As mentioned above, the eurozone crisis has coincided with a shrinkage of the
domestic policy space. Armingeon and Baccaro (2012, p. 264) have argued
that, at the peak of the crisis, ‘domestic institutions and politics, either party- or
interest group-based, have ostensibly played a minor role in selecting the
policy response’. The point of departure of our analysis is that the domestic
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policy space expanded as external pressures subsided, leaving more room for
domestic politics and coalitions to shape policy outcomes.
It has been common in political economy research to link public policies to the
balance of power among social groups in society. While earlier Marxist theorising
saw the political process as a battle for the control of the state between the
working class and the bourgeoisie (see Marx & Engels 1848, p. 15), more recent
studies have adopted a more nuanced view to this approach when analysing the
material base of political cleavages. Iversen and Soskice (2006), for instance, look
at how electoral institutions shape the alliance patterns between low, middle and
high-income groups, resulting in different levels of redistribution. The recent
volume edited by Beramendi et al. (2015) provides a prominent example of the
use of social alliances and electoral politics as key variables to explain social policy
outcomes. Beramendi et al. (2015) assume that political parties represent the
interests of different social constituencies, and that the policies the elites put in
place are constrained by the interests and preferences of these constituencies. At
the micro-level, the kind of job they perform and have learnt is considered an
important locus of political preference formation and socialisation (Kitschelt &
Rehm 2014; Oesch & Rennwald 2018). Here, we also assume that there is
a structural base for voter preferences and party support. This does not mean
that the collective preferences of socio-economic groups are fixed and constant,
but that politicians seek to appeal to the electorate by devising policies that
match their social base of support or allow them to extend it. Similar to Iversen &
Soskice, we ‘assume that parties represent classes, or coalition of classes, and that
it is difficult for parties to commit credibly to electoral platforms that deviate from
the preferences of their constituents’ (Iversen & Soskice 2006, p. 167).
In order to trace the connection between policies and social bases of
support, we use a more sophisticated conception of class than Iversen &
Soskice. This is done by applying Oesch’s (2006) new class schema to
Southern Europe. Oesch argues that post-industrial economies require a new
way to conceptualise class, which cannot be reduced to a dichotomous (work-
ers and managers) or purely unidimensional hierarchy (lower; middle; upper
class). Instead, according to Oesch, patterns of class support for political parties
cut across two cleavages: the traditional cleavage between workers and own-
ers of capital, but also the cleavage between different ‘work logics’. The latter
distinguishes between the interpersonal work logic characterising sectors such
as healthcare, social care, the media or the arts, and the more hierarchical work
logic of production lines and organisations not directly involved in handling
clients. In jobs guided by a hierarchical work logic, authority plays a bigger
role, translating into more authoritarian values than those of ‘interpersonal’
workers. For the purpose of class voting, Oesch proposes a schema of eight
social classes based on the characteristics of the jobs occupied: production
workers (assemblers, carpenters, machinery mechanics); service workers (child-
minders; home helpers, waiters); clerks (secretaries; bank tellers); managers
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(financial managers; public administrators); technical professionals (computing
professionals; mechanical engineers); small business owners (farmers; hairdres-
sers; shopkeepers; owners of small businesses); socio-cultural professionals
(teachers; medical doctors; social workers) and the traditional bourgeoisie of
large employers and self-employed professionals (hotel owners; lawyers).
The main hypothesis of our analysis is that the relative size of these different
groups within the electorate shapes alliance patterns and influences the viability
of different policy agendas (Beramendi et al. 2015, p. 24; Amable 2017).
Following this logic, we posit that office-seeking politicians will have to take
two factors into account in their effort to create a sufficiently large base of
electoral support for their policies (Amable & Palombarini 2009): the relative size
of different groups of voters within the electorate – determining the reformist
agenda they will implement to broaden their base of support – and the relative
weight of different groups of voters within their own electoral base – determin-
ing the content of measures aimed at protecting their traditional voter base. By
extension, the relative weight of these groups of voters within the electorate
determines the likelihood and shape of policies. If the social base of support for
a deregulatory agenda is too small, or in other words if most large groups of
voters within an electorate are hit disproportionately hard by austerity, govern-
ments will face strong electoral incentives to roll over liberalising reforms. We do
not assume a rigid and stable connection between specific social groups and
policy preferences, because party alignments vary over time. According to
Häusermann and Kriesi (2015, p. 217), the self-employed, technical experts,
small business entrepreneurs and managers are more clearly to the right on
economic issues (market liberalism) than production workers, while socio-
cultural professionals are equally hostile to market liberalism. They also find,
however, that class has a low impact on socio-economic preferences in Southern
Europe compared to the West and North, possibly due to a traditionally cliente-
listic mode of voter mobilisation (see Hopkin & Mastropaolo 2001; Afonso,
Zartaloudis & Papadopoulos 2015). However, the fact that preferences across
social classes do not differ much does not undermine the fact that their
preferences matter to politicians; in fact, political elites in a clientelistic system
are probably even more incentivised to satisfy their social constituencies.
It is important to situate our approach in relation to connected work. Recent
analyses often use a broader and somewhat looser definition of the base of
support of economic policy agendas, looking not only at the electorate itself
but also at producer and interest groups yielding power outside electoral
channels (Baccaro & Pontusson 2018). In many ways, it is reasonable to assume
that electoral incentives are not the only inputs that shape and influence
socio-economic agendas, and that the role of organised interests is important
especially in areas that are characterised by ‘quiet politics’ (which are technical
and do not feature prominently in the ‘hot’ politics of electoral campaigns)
(Culpepper 2010). However, we still believe that electoral considerations have
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played a decisive role in shaping policy-makers’ reform agendas, at least in
high salience policy areas like pensions and EPL reforms.
Cases and methods
Case selection
In this section, we justify the rationale for the selection of our case studies and policy
areas of interest. The rationale for comparing Italy and Portugal is that these two
countries were deeply affected by the eurozone crisis. While Portugal was under an
explicit adjustment programme by a Troika of lenders -International Monetary Fund
(IMF), European Central Bank (ECB), European Commission (EC) – between 2011 and
2014, Italy was not. Instead, it found itself in a situation of ‘implicit conditionality’
where the implementation of reforms was an implicit condition for the ECB to
continue buying government bonds (Sacchi 2015). Above all, Portugal and Italy
provide an interesting variation in the relative strength of progressive and con-
servative forces. In fact, while the revolutionary experience has tilted the balance of
the political spectrum in Portugal towards the left (Jalali 2007, p. 73), in the post-war
period Italy has mostly been ruled by conservative parties. This long-term pattern is
echoed in the partisan affiliation of the current governments, an alliance between
the Socialists and the radical left in Portugal and a coalition between the radical
right Lega and the catch-all populist M5S in Italy. This partisan difference provides
an ideal focal point to study the variation in incentives to roll back similar austerity
measures across the political spectrum.
Moving to the choice of our policy areas of interest, pensions and EPL were
chosen because they are highly visible policy areas that underwent radical dereg-
ulatory reforms during the crisis. This makes them crucial most-likely cases to test
our argument about policy reversals. High electoral salience motivates the deci-
sion to select EPL and pensions rather than other less visible policy areas that also
underwent radical reforms like industrial relations (Bulfone & Afonso 2019).
Empirical approach and data
In the empirical section, we proceed in three steps to link the electoral size of
different class groups with patterns of policy reversal and continuity. First, we
compare the size of different electoral class groups in Italy and Portugal to that
of other European countries, identifying similarities and differences. Second,
we describe the ‘social base’ of the main parties in Italy and Portugal by
providing a breakdown of the distribution of socio-economic groups across
party electorates. Third, we link the patterns of reforms and reversals in our
policy areas of interest to the social base of Italian and Portuguese parties.
We draw on data from the ESS, a widely used source of data on political
attitudes and socio-economic conditions in European countries. This data source
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has limitations, however, when it comes to the countries under scrutiny: while
Portugal has participated in all the eight waves of the ESS between 2002 and
2016, Italy has only taken part in four of them (in 2002, 2004, 2012 and 2016).
Due to the small size of some voters’ groups, we decided to merge all the waves
of the ESS to present the class breakdown of parties. This produces a dataset
with reliable estimates of the proportion of each class within each party electo-
rate. However, merging all waves also has the significant drawback of hiding
change in the social composition of party electorates over time. In an online
Appendix (available at https://doi.org/10.1080/13608746.2019.1644809), we pro-
vide estimates of proportions for each ESS wave for each country, with corre-
sponding confidence intervals. This analysis shows that the class setup of party
electorates is fairly stable over time.
We applied the Oesch class schema to the data using the ‘Oesch’ package for
Stata developed by Kaiser (2018). This schema is ideal to deal with post-industrial
labourmarkets, and also has the advantage of being readily and easily applicable to
a number of data sources including the ESS. Because some parties only have a We
recoded party choice in the last election available in the ESS into a smaller number
of categories.1 In Italy, the Partito Democratico (PD – Democratic Party) and its
forerunners the Left-Wing Democratici di Sinistra (DS – Left-Wing Democrats) and
Margherita (Daisy) as centre-left; Forza Italia (FI – Go Italy) and its forerunner Popolo
delle Libertà (PdL – People of Freedoms) as centre-right; the Lega and its forerunner
Lega Nord (LN – Northern League)2 along with Alleanza Nazionale (AN – National
Alliance) and Fratelli d’Italia (FdI – Brothers of Italy) as radical right; and the M5S. In
Portugal, the Partido Socialista (PS – Socialist Party) as centre-left; the Partido Social
Democrata (PSD – Social Democratic Party) merged in the 2016 wave with the
Partido Popular (CDS – People’s Party) as the two parties competed together in 2015
as centre-right, and finally the Partido Comunista Português (PCP – Portuguese
Communist Party), and Bloco de Esquerda (BE – Left Bloc) separately.
Setting aside individuals for whom one or the other dimension was missing,
we obtained a sample of N = 3,271 observations in Italy and N = 11,614 in
Portugal for all waves combined. We present a breakdown of party electorates
by class for each country using post-stratification weights. As data for Italy in
the ESS is less complete – in terms of waves – and does not cover the most
recent 2018 election, we complement it with secondary data from a post-
election survey by Ipsos (2018). In the next section, we provide an overview of
the political and institutional context in which our analysis is embedded.
Political context: governments and coalitions in Italy and Portugal
Italy: from fragile bipolarism to fragmentation and instability
Since the early 1990s, Italy has experienced a prolonged period of political
instability with governments routinely failing to create a sufficiently large base
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of support for their reforms (Amable & Palombarini 2009; Amable, Guillaud &
Palombarini 2011). Between 1994 and 2008, two coalitions competed for office:
the Centre-Left (built around the PD and other minor centrist and leftist parties)
and the Centre-Right (centring on Berlusconi’s PdL/FI and the Lega). While the
third-way pro-European Centre-Left relied on support from unionised workers of
large firms, clerks, and public sector socio-cultural professionals, Silvio Berlusconi’s
Centre-Right was backed by the self-employed, small business owners, shop-
keepers and their employees, mostly based in Northern Italy, as well as by
Southern voters depending on state transfers in the form of employment in an
oversized public sector (Barta 2018; Diamanti 2013). Both coalitions were inher-
ently weak, albeit for different reasons. The Centre-Left electorate was internally
coherent in its preferences, with production workers agreeing to limit their wage
demands in exchange for high employment protection for labour insiders, and
Northern public sector workers accepting the constraints deriving from the
process of European integration because of their universalistic values. However,
these two groups represent a minority within the electorate and the Centre-Left
failed to win relevant support from other groups, managing to win the elections
only twice, in 1996 and (by a razor-thin margin) in 2006. The electorally hegemo-
nic Centre-Right coalition was instead paralysed by the incompatibility of the
preferences of its two core constituencies: small business owners and shop-
keepers from the North and low-income voters from the South. While on the
one hand, small business owners, the self-employed and shopkeepers support
budget cuts, lower taxes, a lenient attitude towards tax evasion and various anti-
competitive protections from the state, fragile voters instead support generous
transfers of public money to the Southern regions (Amable, Guillaud &
Palombarini 2011; Barta 2018). The only way to reconcile these incoherent
demands was through generous public spending.
By reducing the resources political actors could allocate to their voters, the
crisis further complicated the formation of stable electoral coalitions. When
Italy was hit by the crisis, the Centre-Right government was paralysed by the
internal infighting between its Northern and Southern constituencies, and was
thus forced out of office and replaced in late 2011 by the technocratic execu-
tive of Mario Monti (Bulfone & Tassinari 2019). Monti was supported by a very
large majority headed by the PD and Berlusconi’s PdL along with other minor
centrist lists – the NL being the only large party in opposition (Bosco &
McDonnell 2013). Given the internal distributional conflicts pervading both
the centre-left and the centre-right, ‘externalising’ policymaking to
a technocratic government was an expedient way to manage electoral blame.
The Monti government implemented reforms of the pension system and EPL
that hit unionised production workers particularly hard, making them turn their
back to the PD (Table 1). For its part the Centre-Right suffered an erosion of its
support among small business owners, shopkeepers and Southern voters due to its
perceived incapacity to react to the crisis. The contemporary weakening of both the
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main coalitions favoured the rise of the catch-all populist M5S, which won more
than 25 per cent of the votes at the 2013 elections. While the PD won the elections
by a narrow margin over the Centre-Right, both coalitions suffered large losses
among their core constituencies: business owners and self-employed for the
Centre-Right, and socio-cultural professionals for the Centre-Left (Diamanti 2013).
Hence, the 2013 elections aggravated Italy’s political crisis. According to Amable
and Palombarini (2009), it is precisely during these phases of transition that political
leaders have more leeway to shape innovative reformist strategies. This is precisely
what the leader of the PD Matteo Renzi, in power between 2014 and 2016, tried to
do with his reformist agenda3. Renzi severed the ties between the PD, trade unions
and production workers, and instead promoted a centrist neo-liberal agenda aimed
at winning votes from skilled labour market outsiders, the self-employed and small
business owners (Picot & Tassinari 2015; Bulfone & Tassinari 2019).
This strategy was deemed to be an electoral failure, as Renzi antagonised
Southern voters and production workers and failed to win votes among shop-
keepers, the self-employed and small business owners, who remained loyal to
the Centre-Right (Ipsos 2018, pp. 8–12). As a result, a growingly unpopular
Renzi was forced to resign in 2016 being replaced by another PD-led govern-
ment with Paolo Gentiloni as Prime Minister. In the 2018 elections the PD allied
with small centrist parties fell to 22 per cent of the votes, finishing a distant
third to the Centre-Right at 37 per cent (with the Lega replacing Berlusconi’s FI
as the largest party), and the M5S at 32.9 per cent, thus testifying the failure of
Renzi’s centrist strategy (Ipsos 2018).
Portugal: growing polarisation and the unification of the left
The post-authoritarian period (after 1974) in Portugal has been characterised by
a competition for power between the centre-left (PS) and the centre-right bloc
(PSD and CDS-PP in its different incarnations). The PCP was also a relevant player
due to its strength in the rural south of the country and its strong ties with the
Table 1. Governments and policy reforms in Italy, 2008–2018.
Date Prime Minister
Main Coalition
Members Pension Reforms EPL Reforms
2008–2011 Silvio Berlusconi PdL
Lega Nord
Sacconi Reform I (Law 102/
2009)













2013–2014 Enrico Letta PD
NCD
Centrist Parties
2014–2016 Matteo Renzi Jobs Act (2014–2015)
2016–2018 Paolo Gentiloni
Since 2018 Giuseppe Conte Five Star Movement
Lega




Source: Own elaboration based on Bulfone and Tassinari (2019) and Natili and Jessoula (2019)
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trade union movement (Watson 2015, p. 90). However, the PS never opened to
the PCP, choosing instead to cooperate with the centre-right PSD leading to the
de facto exclusion of the radical left from power (Jalali 2007, p. 196). The PS and
the PSD ‘consistently cooperated in an effort to destroy the communists’ organi-
sational base within the labour movement and competed over the same group of
centre-right voters’ (Watson 2015, p. 45), leading to a weak system of protection
for workers. This strategy notably involved the creation of a new trade union, the
UGT (União Geral de Trabalhadores – General Union of Workers) in direct compe-
tition with the Communist-linked CGTP (Confederação Geral dos Trabalhadores
Portugueses – General Confederation of Portuguese Workers) (Jalali 2007, p. 90).
Since the 1980s, the weakening of the PCP and the ‘unfreezing’ of its electorate
opened up competition for working class votes between the PS and the PSD. This
in turn generated a convergence in party programmes coupled with a significant
expansion of social protection for workers (Watson 2015, p. 164). Moreover, it
weakened the class connotation of the PS and PSD electorates, with sociological
variables becoming less important in explaining party choice (Jalali 2007, p. 106).
As a consequence, Portuguese governments have enjoyed a substantial
margin of manoeuvre in their economic policies also due to the generally
low levels of political engagement from citizens and the weak social rooting of
political parties (Magalhães 2005). Essentially, in the absence of credible chal-
lengers, electoral sanctions for unpopular policies mainly took the form of
voter movements between the two centrist parties. Competition around the
centre allowed for an expansion of social protection without significant fiscal
imbalances, at least during the period of high growth between 1986 and 1992
(Amaral 2010, p. 35). After 2000, a policy of disinflation made inevitable by
Portugal’s membership in the European Union led to a phase of low growth
and fiscal consolidation (Amaral 2010, p. 43).
The agenda of policy reforms in Portugal in the 2011–14 period was
essentially guided by the memorandum of understanding (MoU) signed in
early 2011 between the Portuguese government and the Troika (see Moury &
Standring 2017 and Branco et al. 2019) (Table 2). While the bailout was
requested by the PS government of José Socrates, the programme was imple-
mented by the PSD government of Pedro Passos Coelho in coalition with the
CDS-PP. In 2015, the alliance between the PSD and CDS-PP won the largest
share of the popular vote in the elections but failed to secure a vote of
confidence in parliament. This led to the formation of a PS-led government
supported by the PCP and the BE (radical left) coming to power on a pledge to
reverse a number of policies implemented during the adjustment programme
and ‘turn the page of austerity’ to relaunch the economy (Costa 2015). This
alliance, nicknamed the Geringonça (contraption) because of the uneasy fit
between its constituent parties, formed the basis of a government coalition
between the PS and the radical left for the first time in Portuguese history. The
PS government depends on the external support of PCP and BE based on
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separate agreements guaranteeing parliamentary support in exchange for
policy commitments (Fernandes, Magalhães & Santana-Pereira 2018, p. 510).
With a resolutely left-wing slant, the new government committed to rolling
back a number of policies implemented during the crisis.
Class structure of electoral coalitions in Italy and Portugal
From a comparative perspective, the first thing to bear in mind about the class
structure of countries in Southern Europe is that it tends to have a greater
proportion of production workers (with distinct preferences for state interven-
tion) and small business owners, shopkeepers and the self-employed (which
often require state ‘protection’ for instance in the form of a lenient attitude
towards tax evasion); this contrasts with the higher proportion of service
workers and managers in Northern Europe, which can constitute a larger
base for pro-market policies. Figure 1 shows a breakdown of the class structure
of selected European countries as measured by the Oesch class schema
applied to round 8 of the ESS (2016; n = 39,983). This is important to situate
the two countries under analysis within the European context. One can imme-
diately detect the relatively large size of the constituency of (traditionally left-
wing) production workers in our two countries compared to Northern Europe:
production workers in Italy and Portugal represent twice the share found in
the United Kingdom or the Netherlands and are the largest group in the
schema, whereas service workers are the largest group in all other countries
but Switzerland. Another important feature is the importance of small business
owners (shopkeepers and owners of microbusinesses with fewer than ten
employees): Italy and Portugal have the largest constituencies of this group
of all the countries presented here. This is in line with Beramendi et al. (2015)
who argue that production workers and small business owners are, more than
elsewhere, pivotal groups of voters in Southern Europe.
Let us first take a more detailed look at the class composition of party
electorates in Italy (Table 3). As mentioned above, the two largest constitu-
encies in the electorate are production workers and small business owners, the
former representing the largest constituency of the PD and the M5S, and the
latter constituting the largest social constituency of FI and the radical right
(Lega, AN and FdI). Taken together, these two categories represent more than
half of the electorate of FI and the radical right when merging all the ESS
waves. Unfortunately, the available ESS data does not allow us to account for
the recent profound transformation of the party system, with the rise of the
Lega and the decline of FI. Overall, while we would usually assume right-wing
parties to represent higher-income earners and advocate more free-market
policies, the nature of party alignments in the Italian context partially contra-
dicts these assumptions. What is particularly striking about the Italian case, at
least when compared to other South European countries, is the
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underperformance of the PD among low-income voters. This is a consequence
of the relative weakness of the left in Southern Italy, where most low-income
voters are located. It is also due to the pervasiveness of the clientelistic net-
works created by the Democrazia Cristiana (Christian Democracy – DC) in the
post-war Mezzogiorno and later inherited by the PdL/FI (Hopkin & Ignazi 2008).
When the crisis weakened these networks, voters turned to the M5S rather
than to the left (Ipsos 2018).
Our analysis of the class structure of the Italian electorate finds confirmation in an
Ipsos study (2018) on the electoral base of support of the different coalitions at the
2018 elections that uses a different class schema. The PD emerges as themain party
among high-income earners and retiredworkers, winning 22.5 per cent of the votes
among managers and 27.6 per cent among the retired, while underperforming
among production workers (11.3 per cent) and unemployed (ten per cent) (Ipsos
2018, pp. 8–12). This result is the mirror image of that of the Lega, strong among
production workers (23.8 per cent), shopkeepers and small business owners
(23.6 per cent). As a coalition, the Centre-Right – FI, Lega and FdI – was also strong
among the unemployed, winning an aggregate 40 per cent of the votes (ibidem).
Despite winning at least 30 per cent of the votes across all social classes except
retired workers, the M5S was particularly strong among unemployed (37 per cent),
production workers (37 per cent), housewives (36 per cent) and clerks (36 per cent).
Furthermore, theM5Swon 41 per cent of the votes among public sector employees
and 35 per cent of the votes in the 18–34 age group (Ipsos 2018). On the other
hand, the Lega performed particularly well in the 50–64 age group, obtaining
19.7 per cent of the votes. From this analysis, it clearly emerges that the M5S and
the Lega outperformed all other competitors among the three pivotal electoral
constituencies: production workers, Southern voters and small business owners
(ibidem). Although they retained a large electoral base in the North, the M5S
became hegemonic among fragile voters and young labour market outsiders in
the South, attracted by the flagship economic proposal of the citizens’ income
(‘reddito di cittadinanza’) and the promise to repeal Renzi’s EPL reform (see below).
The Lega regained a strong base of support among shopkeepers and small business
owners from the North-East and Lombardy (but this time also from Central Italy),
Table 3. Class breakdown of party electorates in Italy, all available ESS waves combined.
Centre-left Centre-right Radical right Five Star Movement Total
Self-employed professionals 3.50 4.44 4.39 2.36 3.73
Small business owners 15.94 30.05 31.59 19.15 22.34
Technical (semi-)professionals 5.65 3.64 4.24 3.96 4.69
Production workers 26.98 20.57 20.35 25.67 24.16
(Associate) managers 10.65 6.73 6.57 7.05 8.56
Clerks 11.70 12.95 12.25 15.82 12.65
Socio-cultural (semi-) professionals 11.81 8.16 5.73 9.93 9.73
Service workers 13.75 13.46 14.87 16.06 14.13
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Source: own elaboration, based on European Social Survey. See online appendix for breakdown by year and
confidence intervals.
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and became the largest party among production workers. The electoral manifesto
of the Lega centred on four main promises: a crackdown on illegal immigration, the
introduction of a flat tax regime favourable to small businesses, a more lenient
attitude to tax evasion, and the repeal of the pension reform implemented by the
Monti government (Lega 2018).
Turning now to Portugal, we can see both a number of similarities and also
notable differences in the class setup of the electorate as a whole, and of party
constituencies in particular, indicating once again a small base of social sup-
port for austerity and deregulation (Table 4). First, all parties, even on the right
of the political spectrum, depend heavily on the support of production work-
ers, and it is a very strong anchor for both the PS and – even more so – the
PCP. This category alone represents a third of the electorate, and about
40 per cent of the PS and PCP electorates. Taken together, production and
service workers represent nearly two thirds of the electorate of the PS and PCP,
while the backbone of the centre-right is constituted by small business owners
and shopkeepers, followed by production workers, just as in Italy. In general, it
is the weakly differentiated electorate of the PS and the PSD that is striking:
while the share of small business owners is predictably larger within the PSD,
the socioeconomic profile of their electorates is actually quite similar.
Interestingly, although the BE’s agenda is often compared to that of the PCP,
it has the least working-class profile of all Portuguese parties, and – somewhat
similarly to Green or social-democratic parties in Northern Europe – has an
overrepresentation of socio-cultural professionals and intermediary professions
(clerks). The PCP, in contrast, has a more traditionally working-class profile
anchored among production workers.
Italy: reforms, social blocs, continuity and policy reversals
In this section we analyse reforms and post-crisis reversals affecting our two
policy areas of interest – pensions and EPL – in Italy. We will show how the
Table 4. Class breakdown of party electorates in Portugal, all available ESS waves combined.
Socialist Party Centre-right Communist Party (PCP) Left Bloc Total
Self-employed profess 1.35 2.50 1.18 2.68 1.86
Small business owners 12.83 21.94 9.99 13.83 16.27
Technical (semi-)prof 3.25 3.80 4.40 8.09 3.78
Production workers 39.67 26.18 43.15 20.98 33.70
(Associate) managers 4.80 7.97 4.68 8.06 6.20
Clerks 8.84 9.72 7.72 15.42 9.41
Socio-cultural (semi- 6.77 7.27 3.72 16.90 7.21
Service workers 22.49 20.62 25.16 14.04 21.56
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Source: own elaboration, based on European Social Survey. See online appendix for breakdown by year and
confidence intervals.
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class set-up of the electorate presented in the previous sections helps make
sense of patterns of reforms and partial reversals.
Pensions
Italy became involved in the Eurocrisis when it was ruled by the Centre-Right
coalition of Silvio Berlusconi. In August 2011, at the peak of the crisis, the
Berlusconi government received a letter from the ECB which implicitly condi-
tioned the purchase of Italian sovereign bonds to the implementation of
a series of deregulatory reforms. Commenting on the pension system, the
letter asked the government to make the eligibility criteria for retirement
pensions more stringent and to realign the retirement age for women in the
private sector to that established for the public sector (Draghi & Trichet 2011).
In October, the Berlusconi government attempted to pass a pension reform
restricting the eligibility criteria for seniority pensions but had to back down
due to the firm opposition from the LN. The LN opposed the reform because
most seniority pensions go to manufacturing workers from Northern Italy, one
of their reference groups of voters (Sacchi 2015, p. 83). Unable to implement
other austerity measures due to coalitional infightings, and with the spread
between Italian and German bonds spiralling out of control, the Centre-Right
government was replaced in November 2011 by a technocratic executive
guided by Mario Monti.
In December that same year the Monti government passed a reform of the
pension system as part of the ‘Save Italy’ decree. The pension reform, named
after the Minister of Labour, Elsa Fornero, equalised the pensionable age of
genders and across professions at 66 years and 7 months, among the highest in
the EU. Furthermore, ‘seniority pensions were abolished and a new early retire-
ment option was introduced with much tighter conditions’ (Natili & Jessoula
2019, p. 350). The reform was implemented unilaterally without prior negotia-
tions with the social partners and under strong pressure from the bond markets.
This unilateral policy style was meant to obtain financial relief from the ECB on
the bond market by signalling the government’s commitment to austerity
(Sacchi 2015). Although the LN voted against the reform, it could do little to
prevent its implementation as it was now in opposition.
In the period between Monti’s resignation in 2012 and 2018, Italy was ruled
by three coalitions guided by the PD. As the PD was among the main supporters
of the Monti government, none of these coalitions reversed the Fornero pension
reform. During the 2018 electoral campaign, the leader of the Lega, Matteo
Salvini, attacked the Fornero pension reform stating: ‘After 41 years of employ-
ment, if you wish to, you have earned the sacrosanct right to get your money
back . . . The Fornero reform is wrong and it has to be repealed.’ (Repubblica tv
2018). The Lega’s electoral manifesto called for the reintroduction of seniority
pensions for workers with more than 40 years of contributions and the
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introduction of Quota 100 (Quota 100) to allow retirement upon reaching 100 as
the sum of age and years of contributions (Lega Nord 2018, p. 5). When in
power, the Lega earmarked €3.97 billion for the pension reform in the 2019
Budget Law promising to implement the Quota 100 scheme. This would there-
fore correspond to a reversal of the Fornero reform. Coherently with our frame-
work, the Lega made the repeal of the Fornero pension reform one of its main
political priorities because the reform hit one of its core groups of voters. In fact,
many of the 660,000 workers that would benefit from Quota 100 are male
workers from Northern regions like Lombardy, Veneto, Piedmont and Emilia-
Romagna who started working early with a stable contract allowing them to
reach service seniority at a relatively young age (Barbieri 2018).4 An analysis of
voters’ age distribution confirms the salience of pensions amongst the Lega
electorate. In fact, the Lega obtained 19.7 per cent of the votes in the 50–64 age
group (against an overall result of 17.8 per cent), that is to say among the voters
set to directly benefit from Quota 100.
Employment protection legislation
Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, a series of labour market reforms liberal-
ised the use of flexible employment contracts while maintaining a high level of
employment protection for workers on open-ended contracts. This ‘deregulation
at the margins’ led to the widespread diffusion of non-standard employment
among young workers. Workers on open-ended contracts also benefit from very
generous Short-Time Work (STW) schemes5, while unemployment benefits and
activation policies for labour market outsiders were nearly absent (Sacchi & Roh
2016). The two main EPL reforms implemented during the crisis, the Fornero
labour market reform implemented by the Monti government and the Jobs Act,
both aimed to tackle the dual nature of the labour market. Implemented in
June 2012, the Fornero labour market reform lowered the cost of dismissal for
workers on open-ended contracts and reduced the possibility of reinstatement
in case of discriminatory dismissal, thereby watering down the very symbolic
Article 18 of the Workers’ Statute. At the same time, the reform strengthened
the employment benefits for fixed-term contracts (Picot & Tassinari 2017).
The PD-led grand coalition government of Matteo Renzi implemented
a second EPL reform, the Jobs Act. Following in the path of the Fornero reform,
the Jobs Act further reduces employment protection for workers on open-
ended contract by introducing a new open-ended contract with dismissal
protection related to seniority. The new contract excludes the possibility of
reinstatement for economic dismissals and, in case of unfair dismissals and
establishes a monetary compensation between four and 24 salaries (depend-
ing on seniority). The Jobs Act also strengthens the unemployment insurance
scheme for temporary contracts and limits the use of the Cassa Integrazione
Straordinaria (the structural STW scheme) (Picot & Tassinari 2017). The Jobs Act
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represents a sharp break with the previous reformist strategy of the Centre-
Left in that, for the first time, the PD targeted labour market insiders leading to
an open confrontation with the main Italian trade union the Confederazione
Generale Italiana del Lavoro (Italian General Confederation of Labour – CGIL).
Renzi explicitly accused trade unions of defending the worker aristocracy at
the expense of fragile young workers. Despite this pro-outsider rhetoric, how-
ever, the Jobs Act came under heavy criticism from associations representing
young labour market outsiders (as well as from the traditional trade unions)
(Picot & Tassinari 2015).
In electoral terms, the Jobs Act can be seen as an attempt to build a new
socio-economic base of support for the PD (Vesan 2017; Picot & Tassinari
2017), a centrist pro-European bloc formed by skilled labour market out-
siders, large firms, small business owners and self-employed professionals
(akin to Amable & Palombarini’s bloc bourgeois). The contours of this strategy
appear clear when looking at other elements of the reformist agenda of the
Renzi government. For instance, in 2015 the executive raised the limit on
cash transactions to 3,000 euros, rolling over a previous measure by the
Monti government that had fixed the limit at 1,000 euros. This move by the
government was perceived as a way of courting socio-economic groups
responsible for a large share of tax evasion in Italy like ‘small-business owners
and the self-employed (including many doctors and lawyers), who have
traditionally voted for the right.’ (The Economist 2015). However, the refor-
mist strategy did not pay off in electoral terms, as the PD came a distant third
in the 2018 elections.
During the 2018 electoral campaign, the prime ministerial candidate of the
M5S Luigi Di Maio promised to ‘Abolish the Jobs Act’ (La Repubblica 2018).
Once in power, the M5S was the main sponsor of the Decreto Dignita’ (Dignity
Decree) that limited the scope of application of the Jobs Act. Among other
things, the Dignity Decree raised the monetary compensation for unjustified
dismissals or dismissals for economic reasons to a minimum of six salaries and
a maximum of 36 (from four and 24). The Dignity Decree also reduced the
maximum number of temporary contracts an employer can sign with an
employee before having to offer a permanent contract from five to four.
A further reversal of the Jobs Act occurred in September 2018 when the
government reintroduced the structural STW scheme for firms facing the
prospect of a closure (Branco et al. 2019).
Despite restricting the use of temporary contracts, the Dignity Decree
clearly fell short of reversing the Jobs Act. Most notably, it did not re-
introduce the obligation of reinstatement in case of economic dismissals
granted prior to the crisis by Article 18. The M5S and the Lega voted against
an amendment of the radical left asking for the reintroduction of Article 18
for all workers (La Stampa 2018). Hence, the reversal was less radical than in
the case of the pension reform. The limited nature of this second reversal is
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due to firm opposition from the Lega to measures that would go against the
interests of business owners and shopkeepers by making the labour market
more rigid (Bulfone & Tassinari 2019).
Portugal: electoral coalitions and policy reforms
This section analyses reforms and post-crisis reversals in pensions and EPL in
Portugal, linking the social class setup of parties presented above with con-
crete legislative changes in these two areas.
Pension reforms
Adjustments in the pension system had started under the PS government of José
Socrates a few years before the eurozone crisis. The first budget submitted by its
government in 2005 led to a convergence between the many public sector
employment pension regimes and the general social security scheme. This was
achieved by increasing the retirement age and the minimum level of contribution
for special regimes, and moving public servants away to less generous ones.
A new calculation system was also later introduced, setting the level of benefits
based on the entire contributory career rather than the best years, andmaking the
access to early retirement more difficult. On the eve of the bailout, an extraordin-
ary surcharge of ten per cent (Contribuição Extraordinária de Solidariedade – CES)
was introduced on pensions over 5,000 EUR a month (Martins 2015).
The adjustment programme signed between the Troika of international lenders
and the Portuguese government in 2011 led to significant cuts in public pensions
(in real terms, through a pension freeze). New taxes were introduced, startingwith
taxes affecting those at the top of the income distribution and in a second phase
affecting those with lower incomes. At the same time, the PSD government of
Pedro Passos Coelho also increased the lowest pensions at the bottom of the
spectrum. In 2012, the CES mentioned above was expanded to apply at a rate of
25 per cent for pensions over 5,030 EUR and 50 per cent over 7,545 EUR (which
represents more than eight times the average wage). Holiday and Christmas
bonuses, a widespread method to top up wages and pensions, were cut for
pensions over 1,100 EUR, and reduced for pensions between 600 and 1,100
EUR. Later that year, this was blocked by the Constitutional Court.
In 2013, the CES was again further extended in its application to pensions
over 1,350 EUR (with rates between 3.5 per cent and ten per cent). Another
attempt to cut holiday and Christmas subsidies in a way that would comply
with constitutional principles failed, and was scrapped by the Constitutional
Tribunal (Martins 2015). In August, the government negotiated an agreement
with the unions on a legal reform converging the conditions of the pension
scheme for public servants (Caixa Geral de Aposentações) and the general social
security regime applying to private sector employees. In the same year, the
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legal retirement age was increased to 66 years (OECD 2017). Lower pensions
continued to be indexed to inflation while the others were frozen. A new
formula was adopted to automatically increase the retirement age in line with
life expectancy, potentially raising it to 68.8 by 2060. Another attempt to tax
pensions over 1,000 EUR was blocked by the Constitutional Court, meaning
further reforms would be at an impasse in the absence of an agreement with
the PS (Expresso 2014). With elections approaching, the government rolled
back a number of the austerity reforms introduced earlier, targeting the
solidarity contribution to high pensions over 4,611 EUR, and easing access to
early retirement for individuals over the age of 60 and with 40 years of
contributions (Martins 2015).
After the accession to power of the Geringonça, ‘unfreezing’ pensions was
a central point in the political agreements signed in 2015 between the PS, PCP
and BE to ensure parliamentary support (PS & PCP 2015). Accordingly, one of
the measures introduced by the left-wing government was an unfreezing of
pensions and their adjustment to inflation, and a generalised increase in their
amount (Ionline 2018). The 2017 and 2018 budget laws provided for an across
the board ten EUR increase in pensions, and there were discussions on the
possibility of rolling back restrictions on early retirement, allowing workers
with enough years of contributions to retire before the legal age. The restora-
tion of the purchasing power of pensioners was a strong priority for the
government and its allies, particularly the PCP. According to the ESS data
used above, we can establish that 60 per cent of PS voters and 57 per cent
of PCP voters are over the age of 55, compared with a mere 30 per cent among
BE voters. Overall, we can highlight the concentration of austerity measures
through taxes targeting higher-income pensioners, while lower incomes were
spared. This policy was also pursued by the PSD government of Pedro Passos
Coelho. As mentioned above, production workers are the largest constituency
of all parties. This relates to the contribution by Perez and Matsaganis (2019) in
this issue, which shows that Portugal is the only case in Southern Europe in
which the implementation of austerity led to a reduction in inequality.
Employment protection legislation
If one believes in the accuracy of the OECD EPL index, Portugal was an outlier
prior to the crisis due to its high level of protection for permanent contracts,
whereas protection for temporary contracts was in line with the OECD average.
The main objective of the reforms implemented by the Passos Coelho govern-
ment in its revision of the Labour Code in 2012 was to bring protection for
permanent contracts in line with the OECD average, thereby allowing for
quicker downward wage adjustments. A major revision of the Labour Code
(Law 23/2012) was adopted in 2012, providing for a 50 per cent decrease in
compensation for extra hours, a reduction in severance payments, a loosening
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of the conditions for ‘fair dismissal’, fewer holidays and the introduction of an
‘hours bank’ extending by two hours the maximum duration of the normal
working day, which could be compensated later on ((Diario da Republica
2012)). Severance payments were a particularly important element of the
reform in this domain. They were cut from 30 days per year of seniority to
12, thus reducing the cost of dismissal of older – and more expensive –
workers.
While the reversal of EPL reforms passed under the MoU featured promi-
nently in the electoral manifesto of the PS and other left parties, reforms have
been more limited than in the field of pensions. Eventually, the Geringonça
government proposed a package of legislation to reform employment protec-
tion in June 2018 that largely formalised an agreement reached with employ-
ers and (the smaller) trade unions (Martins 2018a; Da Silva 2018). One point of
tension between the PS and the BE was the increase in the maximum proba-
tion period for new contracts from 90 to 180 days. Importantly, the reduction
in severance payments introduced by the 2012 Labour Code revision was
preserved (Publico 2018). In the end, the BE and PCP did not vote in favour
of the package of legislation, which was enabled instead by the abstention of
the PSD similarly to what had been observed at the start of the crisis (Martins
2018b). Whereas the BE was particularly vocal in opposing these reforms, they
seemed to be less of a priority for the PCP. This can be understood in the light
of the social setup of the electorate of these parties: the BE has the highest
share of voters without a permanent contract. Hence, while the legislative
package led to a partial (and modest) reversal, it preserved many measures
adopted during the crisis to increase labour market flexibility (Moury, Cardoso
& Gago 2019; Branco et al. 2019).
Conclusion
In this article, we have provided a granular socio-economic analysis of the electorate
of two South European countries – Italy and Portugal – linking it to patterns of
deregulatory reforms and post-crisis reversals in pensions and EPL. This allowed us
to combine the insights from two prominent debates respectively linking reformist
outcomes to social alliances (Iversen & Soskice 2006; Amable & Palombarini 2009;
Beramendi et al. 2015; Baccaro & Pontusson 2018; Oesch & Rennwald 2018) and
electoral class behaviour (Beramendi et al. 2015; Oesch & Rennwald 2018).
The theoretical framework we employed is based on the assumption that
politicians seeking to broaden their electoral base of support – and therefore
win or retain office – will shape their reform agendas around the preferences of
the main groups of voters belonging to their electoral base, or of those that they
are willing to attract within specific class groups. In doing so, they will be
influenced by two factors: the size of specific groups of voters within the
electorate, and the weight of specific groups of voters within their own electoral
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base. Applying this scheme to post-crisis reversals of austerity measures in
Southern Europe, we argued that policy reversals would in principle be more
frequent in countries in which pivotal groups of voters are hostile to liberal-
isation. Our analysis of the class set-up of Italy and Portugal showed that, in both
countries, governments that came into office after the crisis faced strong incen-
tives to reverse deregulatory reforms of EPL and pensions. This is due to the
weight of constituencies like production workers, perspective retirees and young
workers within their electorate. And indeed, both Portugal’s left-wing coalition
and the alliance between the Lega and the M5S partially reversed deregulatory
reforms implemented by previous governments. However, contrary to our
expectations, there was variation in the extent of the reversals across policy
areas, with reversals being more radical in the field of pensions than in EPL. This
might be due to the fact that the reversal of an EPL deregulatory reform entails
an immediate cost for employers, while the cost of reversing a pension reform is
more long-term and weights on the general public budget. For this reason,
employers might be more willing to lobby against a reversal in the field of EPL
than in pensions. This in turns weakens to some extent the impact of electoral
considerations on executives’ reformist strategies in EPL. Future research should
look at variation in the relative weight of voters’ preferences, interests of
producer groups and exogenous pressure in shaping executives’ reformist
agendas across different policy areas.
The findings presented here should also be refined, and extended, by applying
a similar theoretical framework to the study of reforms and reversals in other South
European countries. For instance, Spain’s class profile seems to bemore in line with
that of other continental economies, with fewer production workers, more service
workers and (slightly fewer) small business owners and shopkeepers than Italy and
Portugal. Scholars should assess the impact of this different class configuration on
the patterns of reform and reversal there. Another promising research avenue is to
look more systematically at cross-country variation in the ideological preferences of
pivotal groups of voters – and their impact on governments’ reformist strategies.
For instance, while rural and low-income voters historically developed strong ties
with the left in Spain and Portugal (Hopkin & Mastropaolo 2001), their counterparts
in Southern Italy had always supported conservative forces (the DC and later the
Centre-Right), before recently turning to the M5S. This difference in electoral
preferences of low-income voters has the important effect of limiting the scope
to implement a left-wing anti-austerity reformist agenda in Italy. Further research
should extend this analysis to other pivotal groups of voters in countries with
fragmented electorates like Greece and France.
Notes
1. The elections covered in the European Social Survey waves are the following. Italy:
waves 1 and 2 relate to the 2001 national election; waves 6 and 8 relate to 2013.
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Portugal: waves 1 and 2 relate to 1999; waves 3 and 4 relate to 2005; wave 5 relates
to 2009; wave 6 and 7 relate to 2011; wave 8 relates to 2015.
2. The Lega Nord was rebranded Lega in 2018 to appeal to a nationwide audience.
3. Renzi led a coalition between the PD and some smaller centrist and conservative
parties. He succeeded Enrico Letta, also from the PD, who had formed a large
coalition government after the 2013 elections. The change in government was the
result of an internal coup within the PD.
4. While Lombardy, Veneto and Piedmont are traditional electoral strongholds, the Lega
also broadened its base of support in the former left-leaning Emilia-Romagna reach-
ing 19 per cent of the votes.
5. STW schemes subsidise a temporary reduction in working hours in a way to allow
firms in crisis to maintain an existing employer/employee relationship.
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